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NOTES
PARADES AND PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS: PUNCTUAL
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON FIRST
AMENDMENT LIBERTIES
In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,' the Supreme Court has served
notice that the constitutional validity of local parade ordinances hence-
forth will depend on the presence of provisions for speedy judicial review.
This decision represents a significant contraction of what constitutes
permissible prior restraint on first amendment liberties. It heralds a
licensing system designed to protect legitimate state interest while fore-
closing the opportunity for arbitrary official action.
The case, the legal climax of a 1963 prosecution of civil rights leaders
for protest activities in Alabama,2 was presented in a manner designed to
1. 281 Ala. 542, 206 So. 2d 348, rev'd 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
2. Fred Shuttlesworth and other civil rights leaders were convicted in the
Recorder's Court of Birmingham, Ala., for failure to procure a permit before engaging
in mass street parades and processions, as required by § 1159 of the Birmingham City
Code which provides:
It shall be unlawful to organize or hold, or to assist in organizing or holding
or take part or participate in any parade or procession or public demonstration
on the streets or other public ways of the city, unless a permit therefor has
been secured from the commission.
. . . The commission shall grant a written permit for such parade, procession
or public demonstration prescribing the streets or other public ways which may
be used therefor, unless in its judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health,
decency, morals or convenience require that it be refused.
The case was appealed to the Court of Jefferson County where a de nzovo jury con-
victed Shuttlesworth, sentencing him to ninety days in jail and fining him seventy-five
dollars. The Alabama Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the latter decision, holding
that the petitioners' activity was merely peaceful picketing and not subject to regulation
by the Birmingham parading ordinance.
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed this decision, finding that this type of
conduct was subject to regulation under the parading ordinance. The court attempted to
narrow sufficiently the discretion of the granting official in order to deter the U.S.
Supreme Court from striking the ordinance down as conferring unbridled discretion on
the licensing official. The U.S. Supreme Court had earlier said in Cox v. New Hamp-
shire that there should be "systematic, consistent, and just order of treatment, with
reference to the convenience of the public use of the streets." 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
The Court did not require that New Hampshire incorporate a more specific standard
for official behavior in its parade ordinance. The ordinance was construed, therefore,
to give a licensing official no discretion to deny permits once even-handed methods
were used to ensure that the safety, comfort and convenience of the public in the use of
the streets would not be unduly disturbed. Furthermore, the Alabama Court said that
there was no evidence that the ordinance had been enforced discriminatorily.
In a companion case, Walker v. Birmingham, 279 Ala. 53, 181 So. 2d 493, aff'd
388 U.S. 307 (1967), the civil rights leaders were found in contempt for disobeying an
injunction, issued by an Alabama circuit court at the request of local officials, forbidding
them to engage in such demonstrations without first receiving the required permit.
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tempt the Court to strike down a Birmingham parade ordinance as void
on its face. To this end, it was not alleged that the petitioners had
previously applied for a permit to parade nor that officials had arbitrarily
denied them the permit, nor was the Court asked to base its holding on
the grounds that the ordinance was enforced discriminatorily. Instead,
the issue presented to the Court was whether the ordinance ever could be
enforced validly.3 In the past, the Court always has upheld a state's right
to employ a system of prior restraints on parading." Standing to test the
constitutionality of a parading ordinance traditionally has required prior
application for a permit, since the local interest in regulating street
Two days remained between the issuance of the injunction and marches scheduled
for Good Friday and Easter Sunday. In those two days, no, attempt was made to have
the injunction dissolved, and no requests for permits were made. Authorities were in-
formed, however, of prospective parade routes and times. Both protest marches took
place as planned and were conducted in a peaceful manner. Protesters marched two-
abreast on sidewalks and did not obstruct vehicles or pedestrians. The only reported
incident of violence was rock-throwing by three bystanders. March leaders were
arrested both days a few blocks from the starting points. Shuttlesworth was among
those arrested on each occasion. The march leaders tried to argue that both the parade
ordinance on which the injunction was based and the injunction were void; however,
the circuit court considered only the questions of notice and violation of the order
because Alabama procedure required that the validity of injunctive orders be tested by
motions to dissolve and not in collateral proceedings. The issue ultimately raised by the
case was whether a state procedural rule validly can deny standing to a marcher to assert
in a contempt proceeding the unconstitutionality of the ordinance on which the injunction
is based when the marcher had sufficient time to test the validity of the injunction
through an approved state procedure. The Supreme Court held that a state could
preclude such standing and, therefore, review of the federal claims. Several strong dis-
sents followed in which four justices argued that it was patently unjust to convict
someone of contempt when the ordinance had been administered to discriminate against
petitioners and when both the injunction and the ordinance on which it was based were
unconstitutional.
Petitioners in Walker were not allowed to prove discriminatory enforcement of the
ordinance. Some attempt had been made in the hearing to show cause that the marchers
tried to secure permits to parade, but the evidence was held inadmissible. Chief Justice
Warren, in his dissent, says, however, that discrimination in law enforcement in
Birmingham is a matter of public record. He cites the REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
CoMM ISSION ON CIviL RIGHTS 114 (1963), which found abuse of civil rights protestors
by Birmingham police. City Safety Commissioner Eugene "Bull" Connor, a self pro-
claimed white supremist, was the official who denied early requests for permits and also
requested that the injunction issue.
The Court in Shuttlesworth used evidence of prior discrimination in the issuance of
permits to protestors to reverse the Alabama Supreme Court. The Court is free in
cases involving first amendment freedoms to make its own determination of ultimate
facts. See e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
3. Another case in which the issue was framed in the same manner is Times
Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), where the Supreme Court held that since
the movie exhibitor had not applied for a permit to show his film, the question of the
constitutionality of the censoring ordinance was unripe. The Court said that the only
question presented was whether there ever could be a valid prior restraint of a showing
under the ordinance in question.
4. The parading area has been given some first amendment protection, but a
significant state interest in regulating conduct also has been recognized. Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965) ; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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demonstrations and parades is deemed sufficiently strong to preclude the
courts from striking down such statutes in the abstract. Thus, courts
allow a state to deny standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
parade ordinance if the challenger has not applied for a permit.5
The dilemma facing the Court in Shuttlesworth was whether to
upset the tradition of treating ordinances imposing prior restraints on
conduct and only incidentally regulating speech differently from those
imposing prior restraints on pure speech or, in effect, to affirm a system of
arbitrary local restraint on first amendment rights.6 The Court solved
the dilemma by using facts from Walker v. Birmiingham to reframe
the issues.!
In Walker evidence tended to prove that, in the week before the
injunction was issued, the civil rights group had made two attempts to
secure a permit for its protest activities. First, a woman representative
was refused such a permit by Safety Commissioner Eugene "Bull"
Connor.8 Later Shuttlesworth sent a telegram to Connor requesting a
permit. Connor replied that only the entire city commission could grant
permits.9 In addition, an offer of proof was made in Walker that Connor
usually referred the matter of parade applications to a traffic clerk, not
to the entire commission.'" The Court felt that the evidence indicated that
the ordinance was discriminatorily applied against the petitioners. Thus
the Alabama Supreme Court's finding of no discriminatory enforcement
was reversed.
There has always been a requirement that there be consistent en-
5. The only cases which have allowed testing the constitutionality of an ordinance
which places a prior restraint on first amendment rights without first showing that
such conduct was not properly subject to regulation have been in the pure speech area.
See e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The Court in Shuttlesworth says
that the valid inquiry in a case involving an ordinance regulating conduct and only
incidentally regulating speech is whether the ordinance in fact was enforced dis-
criminatorily.
6. In other words, as the issue was presented, the Court either could strike the
ordinance down as void on its face or say that the only issue presented to the Court was
whether there could ever be a valid refusal to issue a permit under the parading ordin-
ance. The N.A.A.C.P. legal defense was hoping the Court would find the ordinance
void on its face. In the past, some members of the Court have expressed the opinion
that no permit systems should be allowed in the first amendment area. See the dissenting
opinion in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago. 365 U.S. 43, 50 (1961).
7. The Court suggested that it was able to take "judicial notice" of the facts found
in Walker, since common parties were involved in both cases. 394 U.S. at 157, citing
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 336 (1930).
8. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. at 317 n. 9, 325, 335, 339. Harlan, J., con-
curring in Shuttlesworth, objects to the use of these facts, because they were held
inadmissible by the trial judge. 394 U.S. at 160 n.1.
9. 388 U.S. at 318 n.10, 325, 335-36.
10. Id. at 325, 326, 336, 340.
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forcement of parading statutes." Had the Court simply restated this
standard, its opinion would have been relatively insignificant; however,
there are several aspects of Shuttlesworth differentiating it from prior
cases involving discriminatory enforcement. First, the Court allowed pet-
itioners to circumvent the state system of orderly review. Next, the Court
suggested that special circumstances in the parading situation made it
impossible to safeguard the petitioners by providing federal standards for
official behavior. Finally, the Court extended to the parading situation
standards formerly applied in movie censorship cases. This note will treat
and evaluate each of these subjects sequentially.
The Supreme Court in Shuttlesworth said that the petitioners did
not need to appeal the official denial of their request for a permit to
march.12 The defendants were not required to follow an appellate system
established by the state for orderly review. The Supreme Court held, in
effect, that a state could not deny the marcher's standing to assert the
unconstitutional denial of a permit as a defense to a prosecution for
marching without such a permit.
According to the Court, support for not requiring the petitioners to
appeal this denial in the Alabama court system may be found in the fact
that the petitioners had no way of knowing whether the Alabama
Supreme Court would give the ordinance an adequately narrow con-
struction.' Apparently the Court meant that, since the statute was not
construed until after the Easter weekend marches, the petitioners could
not be considered recipients of the later narrow construction. When the de-
fendants acted, the ordinance remained vague. The case law of lower
federal courts is in accordance with this result; in the absence of inter-
pretation by the highest state court, such parading ordinances are void.'4
Justice Harlan, concurring in Shuttlesworth, suggests that petitioners
be required to follow normal review procedures unless those procedures
are so time-consuming as effectively to deny first amendment rights. 5
11. The Supreme Court allowed the New Hampshire court to permit an official
to refuse to license a march if "[t]here is no evidence that the statute has been
administered otherwise than in a fair and non-discriminatory manner which the state
court has construed it to require." Cox v. New Hampshire, 321 U.S. 569, 577 (1941).
12. 394 U.S. at 158.
13. Id.
14. In Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967), a similar Louisville
parading ordinance was held to be void on its face. In Guyot v. Pierce, 372 F.2d 658
(5th Cir. 1967), a similar Mississippi parade ordinance was held to be void on its face
even though the Mississippi Supreme Court had construed a similar ordinance as
granting the official in charge no unconstitutional discretion.
15. Justice Harlan says:
The right to ignore a permit requirement should, in my view, be made to turn
on something more substantial than a minor official's view of his authority
under the governing statute.
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He points out that Alabama has no provision for speedy review of official
denials of parade permits and that the ordinance does not stipulate a time
period during which the commission must make the original decision.'"
Consequently, he argues, years could pass before a decision finally is made
on a case. Justice Harlan states, however, that when measures for speedy
review of official decisions are provided, protesters must be required to
follow state procedures for review or the states' ability to control conduct
on their streets will be hampered seriously.' 7 Situations easily could arise
in which demonstrators arbitrarily denied permits to march would begin
parading in downtown areas, disrupting traffic. Traffic tie-ups in large
cities can last for several hours and cause angry crowds of motorists to
clash with protesters. 8 If, after causing a major disruption, such pro-
testers were allowed to assert the arbitrary denial of the permit as a
defense to prosecution for marching without a permit, when means for
correcting the official decision were readily available, the state's ability to
keep streets open for the benefit of the public would be impaired.
The Alabama Supreme Court construed the parading ordinance so
that officials had no discretion to deny permits after assuring that the
safety, comfort and convenience of the public in the use of the streets
would not be disturbed unduly. However, the Alabama court indicated
that actually incorporating standards for official behavior into the statute
would be useless, since individual factual situations vary greatly."9 The
Simply because an inferior state official indicates his view as to a
statute's scope, it does not follow that the State's judiciary will come to the
same conclusion. Situations do exist, hQwever, in which there can be no
effective review of the decision of an inferior state official.
394 U.S. at 160.
16. 394 U.S. at 160-61.
17. Id. at 159-60. Other opinions dealing with the question of state procedural
grounds indicate that where a state supplies an adequate means of reviewing official
decisions, the state system of orderly review must be followed. In Poulos v. New
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 414 (1953), the Court upheld New Hampshire's refusal to allow a
Jehovah's Witness to assert the wrongful denial of a permit to gather in the open as a
defense to a prosecution for marching without a permit. The Court said:
In the present prosecution there was a valid ordinance, an unlawful re-
fusal of a license, with remedial procedures for correction of that error. The
state had the authority to determine in the public interest, the reasonable
measure for correction of error....
345 U.S. at 396.
18. The recent tie-ups in Philadelphia resulting from protests against discriminatory
hiring practices are a good example of this. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1969 at 1, col. 1.
19. 281 Ala. at 545, 206 So.2d at 350. The situation involving a vague parade ordi-
nance resembles in some ways that in Baggit v. Bullit, 337 U.S. 360 (1964) and Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). Of course, there is no issue of abstention present
in Shuttles-worth; however, the inability of the state supreme court construction to change
the issue in the litigation is present. One could argue that the U.S. Supreme Court should
strike down the parade ordinance in spite of the attempted narrowing construction, because
the mere incorporation of general standards for official behavior in the ordinance will in
no way impede the ability of the officials to discriminate without check. Therefore, the
REVIEW OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS
U. S. Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether the attempted
limiting construction saved the ordinance but remarked that
[t]he validity of this assumption [the ordinance's constitution-
ality] would depend upon, among other things, the availability
of expeditious judicial review of the commission's refusal of
a permit.2"
This statement implicitly recognizes that the narrowing construction or
incorporation of general standards for official behavior will in no ef-
fective way limit the power of local officials to discriminate against
groups espousing unpopular views." The real issue in every case will
remain the same, even after construction: good faith local enforcement.22
Prior decisions merely required that parade ordinances embody stan-
dards for official conduct comparable to those enunciated by the court.2"
Inherent in the Court's refusal to regard the construction as sufficient
is a recognition of the special nature of the parading situation: a local
official effectively can deny permission to exercise a first amendment
right. Seldom is a great deal of money at stake in the parading situation;
therefore, denial of a permit usually is not appealed. Even if valuable
intangible.rights are at stake, as in a civil rights march, timing is of the
essence, and a lengthy appeal would virtually preclude the march from
being conducted.24 As a result, the group is forced to abandon the parade
or face prosecution for marching without a permit. Furthermore, the
group will have no defense for the wrongful denial of the permit in the
prosecution if the state is allowed to deny it standing. Consequently,
construction is useless, because it is unable in any way to solve the issue in any case aris-
ing under the ordinance: good faith enforcement. However, one also could argue that the
mere possibility of erroneous application of the statute does not amount to the irreparable
injury necessary to justify the disruption of orderly state proceedings. Cameron v.
Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 621 (1968).
20. 394 U.S. at 155 n.4. Th Court then cited Justice Frankfurter's concurring
-opinion in Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 420 (1953) ; Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965) and Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Shuttesworth. Harlan
suggested the additional requirement be imposed that the commission have to make its
decision within a specific amount of time. 394 U.S. at 160-61.
21. See note 19 supra.
22. In order for the Court to take a significant step toward the elimination of
discrimination by local officials, it had to suggest that states set up a system of checks
more efficient than the one in which the Supreme Court decides the factual issue of
discrimination. Very little overt discrimination remains in the law; therefore, questions of
application are the ones which will appear. Minority groups feel that most discrimination
that blocks their access to wealth and power comes from local government official-.
'institutions and hiring practices. See J. WiTERspooN, ADMINIS'RATIVE IMPLEMENTATION
OF Civus RIGHTS 28 (1968). Case-by-case approach is a tedious way to obtain results.
23. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) ; Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U.S. 395 (1953).
24. See 394 U.S. at 160-61. (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the official decisions go unchecked. The knowledge that aggrieved min-
ority groups are most often without money, power and popular support
leaves the granting official practically free from the threat of legal action,
political pressure or public censure as a result of denying access to the
streets. The very reasons that some would give for making the public
forum available to such groups encourage the official to deny them use
of the streets.25 The mere existence of these parade ordinances under
which such official behavior is sanctioned has a stifling effect on the ex-
ercise of first amendment freedoms.26
The Supreme Court took two steps in Shuttlesworth to minimize the
potential danger in local parade ordinances. First, the Court liberalized
the standing requirement for Supreme Court review to make it clear that
states cannot convict paraders who attempt to comply with the permit
system and are denied permits wrongfully. Secondly, municipalities were
warned that failure to incorporate provisions for speedy judicial review of
their decisions regarding parade permits might bring subsequent action
by the Court against the parading ordinances.27
When the Court, in note four of the opinion, made future validity of
a parade permit system depend upon the presence of provisions for quick
review, it referred to another area of the law, that of motion picture
censoring, in which similar ordinances have been struck down as the
result of comparable deficiencies. Many cities have ordinances which
require film exhibitors to submit films to a board of censors before
showings are permitted. In Freedman v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
said that no prior restraint could be imposed in this area in the absence of
speedy judicial review of the censor's decision.28
Aside from the strong suggestion in footnote four of Shuttlesworth
that states should look for guidance to the case of Freedman v. Maryland
and Frankfurter's concurrence in Poulos v. New Hampshire, there is no
clear indication in Shuttlesworth of what the Court believes to constitute a
valid parade ordinance.29 It appears, however, that in light of the Court's
references to these film censorship cases, an official who wishes to deny
some group the use of the streets to parade will either have to go to court
immediately afterwards to justify his action or seek an injunction against
25. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Fornm, 1965 S. CT. REv. 1, 11; Adderly
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (Warren, Brennan, Douglas and Fortas, dissenting).
26. See Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967), and Guyot v. Pierce,
372 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1967), in which federal courts took jurisdiction without abstaining
because of Dombrowski v. Pfister.
27. See note 20 supra.
28. 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
29. See note 20 supra.
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the group marching."0 It is not clear what power, if any, an ordinance can
give to officials over time and route, because such power can result in
effective denial of the right to parade; a group march, for example, might
be relegated to a late hour or a side street if such powers are too broad.3"
It is, however, clear from past decisions that one does not have an
unfettered right to maximum exposure of his ideas or even to their
expression in what he considers the most meaningful manner. 2 Perhaps,
therefore, cities could enact ordinances that forbid all parades, marches
and demonstrations on busy thoroughfares at times of heavy traffic.
The Supreme Court sets no standards for state judicial review of
official decisions, because no case yet has arisen in which a parade ordin-
ance has been struck down. The Court simply may wish to protect
citizens from decisions of non-judicial officers regarding their right to
exercise first amendment freedoms."3 Nothing that the Court has said
would lead one to believe that an official could not validly refuse a permit
simply because the normal flow of traffic would be disturbed unduly or
that the police had reasonable fear that violence would erupt. In contrast,
in Terminello v. Chicago, the Court held that fear of violent reaction to a
speaker's words was not sufficient reason to deny him the right to speak.'
30. Cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 58. Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown, 354
U.S. 436 (1957) upheld a New York ordinance providing for an injunction to maintain
the status quo while the question of whether a book dealer was selling obscene literature
was being litigated. This same type of procedure could be utilized to prevent a street
demonstration while a court was examining the refusal of a permit.
31. In Cox v. New Hampshire, the Court said that, if a municiaplity was going to
control the use of its streets, then it should be allowed to give consideration without
unfair discrimination to time, place and manner in relation to proper use for the streets.
312 U.S. at 576. It appears that perhaps an official without judicial sanction could
preclude the use of certain streets at busy times.
32. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning) ; Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (loud speaker) and People v. Radich 53 Misc. 717, 279
N.Y.S. 2d 680 (1967), aff'd 294 N.Y.S. 2d 285 (1968) (obscene sculpture) lend support
to the idea that one is not free to express an idea in the manner which would have
greatest impact. Considerations of public comfort and state interest in prohibiting certain
types of conduct militate against even peaceful symbolic conduct.
33. This idea is supported by the fact that in Walker the Court upheld the state's
right to require the petitioners to test the injunction through the procedure for review
provided by Alabama. One reason for that holding is that, theoretically, a petitioner's
rights are, more carefully guarded when a judicial officer decides to restrict their
exercise.
34. 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). There has been a recognition of the special danger pre-
sented by mass demonstrations which militates against the Court treating the parade
area like the pure speech area. Justices Black, Harlan and White say in Bell v. Maryland:
A great purpose of freedom of speech and press is to provide a forum for
settlement of acrimonious disputes peaceable [sic], without resort to intimida-
tion, force or violence. The experience of ages points to the inexorable fact
that people are frequently stirred to violence when property which the law
recognizes as theirs is forcibly invaded or occupied by others. . . . Force
leads to violence, violence to mob conflicts, and those to rule by the strongest
groups with control of the most deadly weapons.
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Whether the Court will in fact impose the same requirements on
parade ordinances as on movie censoring ordinances is a matter of con-
jecture. It is true that the two areas are somewhat analagous and that
both activities are entitled to some first amendment protection. In both
situations, the person denied a permit to exercise his right effectively has
been denied this right by a low level, non-judicial official. However, the
two areas also differ significantly, and thus the respective state regulations
perhaps should be allowed to vary accordingly. The possible effect on the
public of the exhibition of an objectionable film is obviously far different
from the possible effect of an unauthorized march. At most, one could
say that concern about a film exhibition is limited to the desire to
prevent the corruption of young children. An adult who finds a film
objectionable simply can leave the theater. No one need watch a film that
he does not wish to see, and its exhibition does not interfere with his
rights. On the other hand, a parade or protest demonstration in the
streets can tie up traffic for hours."5 A relatively insignificant cause can
bring as much disruption as an important one. All persons using the
streets and sidewalks are subjected to a spectacle promoting something
for which they may have extreme antipathy. The probability of violence
occurring in reaction to and in the course of a mass demonstration is thus
much greater. It would seem, then, that local officials perhaps should be
given broader powers to control parading activities than movie ex-
hibitions.36 However, the Court draws no distinction between the two
areas in its brief encounter with the problem of official discrimination.
It is possible that the Court will follow through with its threat to strike
down parading statutes only when the petitioner wrongfully has been
denied a permit. The Court certainly seems to threaten, however, that it
will strike down as void on their face those parading ordinances which are
not accompanied by, or do not incorporate provisions for, speedy review. "7
Thus, a group which deliberately did not apply for a permit could conduct
378 U.S. 226, 346 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
Some recent articles on the subject of peaceful protest activities have attributed
the Court's failure to extend more protection to peaceful activities to the frequent use of
obstructive and violent conduct by minority groups to gain objectives. See Greenberg,
The Supreme Court, Civil Rights and Civil Dissonance, 77 YALE L.J. 1520 (1968).
Louis Lusky goes so far as to say that when groups employ techniques of obstructive
conduct in a society which relies on voluntary compliance with the law, the society
contracts some of the previously given protection in the free speech area. Lusky,
The King Dream; Prophecy or Fantasy, 68 COLUm. L. REv. 1029 (1968).
35. See note 18 supra.
36. Some authority suggests that a different conclusion might be warranted if the
liberties at stake in the parading situation were decidedly superior to those in motion
picture exhibition. Regulations suppressing political expression, for example, might be
subject to closer scrutiny than those governing less consequential behavior. Cf. Carolene
Products v. United States, 320 U.S. 760 (1923).
37. 394 U.S. at 155.
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a disruptive march and then challenge successfully the constitutionality of
such a parade ordinance, even though their conduct was a proper subject
of regulation. 8 This result would go too far in denying legitimate state
interests, such as protection of protestors and anticipation of possible
traffic problems. Municipalities which heed the Shuttlesworth warning,
however, will not have this problem, for they will incorporate in their
parade ordinances provision for prompt judicial review.
The narrowest possible interpretation of the Court's holding in the
Shuttlesworth case is that § 1159 of the Birmingham City Code was
discriminatorily and hence unconstitutionally applied to the petitioners.
The Court, in reversing Shuttlesworth's conviction, implicitly holds that
one wrongfully denied a permit to parade can assert that wrongful denial
as a defense in a prosecution for parading without a permit. Thus, as the
law now stands, local officials may prosecute a person who has not
applied for a permit to march under a parade ordinance similar to Birm-
ingham's only at the risk of subsequent judicial reversal. For the
Shuttlesworth Court threatens to strike down in the future these ordin-
ances containing no measures for quick judicial review of official deci-
sions.
The significance of the Shuttlesworth case lies in its expansion of the
scope of federal appellate review. By allowing the protester to assert the
wrongful denial of a parade permit itself, the Court has vested in the
federal courts the right to decide the question of discriminatory applica-
tion on appeal. By urging states to reform their parading ordinances
through the addition of provisions for quick review, the Supreme Court
recognizes also the limited power of the conventional appeals system to
alleviate official misconduct. The Supreme Court implies that the federal
court system is not the most efficient place to check discriminatory en-
forcement, since a case-by-case approach will never control local wide-
spread unequal treatment. Therefore, it urges states to check their own
officials.
In spite of the legal prohibitions against discrimination, minority
groups still receive unequal treatment, indicating that discrimination is
not precluded through fair laws but through unbiased official action best
checked quickly and efficiently on the local level. If there is any conclusion
38. When a statute purports to regulate the dissemination of ideas, proof of an
abuse of official power has never been held requisite to testing its constitutionality.
Staube v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1948); Sneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939);
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 576 (1939) ; Lowell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 457 (1936).
The Birmingham parade ordinance, on the other hand, purports only to regulate conduct.
Serious questions exist whether the act of parading is necessarily expressive and entitled
to any protection apart from protection given to peaceful picketing and the right to
associate. See Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUm. L. Rav. 1091 (1968).
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to be drawn from this case, it is that arbitrary action by an official
easily can undermine the clearest of legislative standards.
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